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INTEREST ANALYSIS, STATE SOVEREIGNTY, AND
FEDERALLY-MANDATED CHOICE OF LAW IN
"MASS TORT" CASES
Robert A. Sedler*
I. PRELUDE: MODERN CHOICE OF LAW MEETS THE "MASS TORT"
In the thirty years that have gone by since Babcock v. Jackson1
ignited the choice-of-law revolution in this country, there has
emerged what may be called a "modern choice-of-law consensus" in
conflicts tort cases. In the years after Babcock, and continuing to the
present time, there has been fierce academic controversy over the
preferred approach to choice of law. However, the courts that have
abandoned the traditional approach to choice of law, as the over-
whelming number of them have done,2 have had relatively little diffi-
culty in resolving the actual conflicts tort cases that have come before
them. The courts have also reached fairly uniform results in the dif-
ferent fact-law patterns that are presented in conflicts tort cases,8 re-
gardless of which "modern" approach to choice of law they purport
to follow.4 I have demonstrated that these results are generally con-
sistent with the results that would be reached under the interest
analysis approach to choice of law as developed by Brainerd Currie 5
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., J.D., University of Pittsburgh.
191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
At the present time, there are no more than 13 states that continue to follow the traditional
approach in all respects. See the listing of states in Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law
Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 373 & n.112 (1992). The article
lists 15 states, including South Dakota and Tennessee, both of which abandoned the traditional
approach after the article went to press. See Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 63
(S.D. 1992); Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992).
' See the discussion of fact-law patterns in conflicts tort cases in Robert A. Sedler, Rules of
Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44
TENN. L. REV. 975, 980-81 (1977).
See generally ROBERT A. SEDLER, AcRoss STATE LINES: APPLYING THE CONFLICT OF LAWS TO
YOUR-PRACTICE 50-58 (1989); Sedler, supra note 3, at 1032-41; see also Borchers, supra note 2
(analyzing the results in conflicts tort cases in terms of forum law, recovery law, and local
favoring law). Professor Borchers concludes that: "Courts do not take the new approaches seri-
ously. Because all of the competitors to the First Restatement start from different analytical
premises, if courts were faithful to their tenets they would inevitably generate different result
patterns. Yet in practice the outcomes are largely indistinguishable." Id. at 379.
' See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
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and refined by his followers. Most clearly this is so with respect to
the "false conflict" and the "true conflict." In the false conflict situa-
tion, where only one state has a real interest in having its law applied
to implement the underlying policy of that law, the courts have inva-
riably applied the law of the only interested state. In the true conflict
situation, where both of the involved states have a real interest in
having their laws applied to implement the conflicting policies re-
flected in those laws, the forum will usually apply its own law in
order to implement its own policy and interest.7
In practice, then, the modern choice-of-law revolution sparked by
Babcock has witnessed the emergence of interest analysis as the oper-
ative approach to choice of law in conflicts tort cases today.' The un-
derlying policies and the interests of the respective states in having
their laws applied to implement those policies have now become the
dominant considerations in resolving conflicts tort cases.' Today
then, choice of law in conflicts tort cases has arrived at a point far
distant from where it was in the pre-Babcock era, when all courts
adhered to the broad, state-selecting rules of the traditional
approach.
In the thirty years since Babcock, conflicts tort cases have also un-
dergone their own "revolution". At the time of Babcock, most con-
flicts tort cases presented relatively simple fact-law patterns. Most of
the conflicts questions arose in interstate automobile accident cases
in which frequently, as in Babcock, two residents of the same state
would be involved in an automobile accident in another state; less
frequently would the plaintiff and defendant reside in different
states. Occasionally, there would be a case involving an interstate
plane crash or a products liability claim. In virtually all of the con-
flicts cases that arose in practice, the facts were not complicated and
the choice-of-law issue was fairly straightforward.
See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in the Conflict of Laws and
the Use of that Analysis in Products Liability Cases, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 493 (1985); Robert A.
Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformula-
tion, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181 (1977).
See the discussion and review of cases in Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum
Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the "New Critics," 34 MERCER L. REV. 593,
635-43 (1983).
" For a further discussion of the application of interest analysis by the courts in practice, see
Robert A. Sedler, Professor Juenger's Challenge to the Interest Analysis Approach to Choice-
of-Law: An Appreciation and a Response, 23 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 865, 891-94 (1990) [hereinafter
Sedler, Response to Juenger].
9 It may also be noted that the policies and interests reflected in the laws of the involved
states are a relevant, if not controlling, consideration in virtually all of the other modern ap-
proaches to choice of law.
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The choice-of-law issues in those cases also reflected the substan-
tive tort law differences that existed at that time. By far the largest
number of conflicts tort cases, as exemplified in Babcock and the
other "casebook standards," revolved around a guest statute or other
traditional form of tort immunity. Most of the other conflicts tort
cases of that era involved issues of contributory fault or general limi-
tations on wrongful death recovery. Very few states have guest stat-
utes today, and the other traditional forms of tort immunity have
been abolished in most states. So too, most states have replaced con-
tributory negligence with some form of comparative negligence. Gen-
eral limitations on wrongful death recovery have ceased to exist. To-
day, conflicts tort cases are no longer limited to the simple two-party
interstate automobile accident that was the staple of the Babcock
era. Moreover, the now superseded substantive tort law differences
that gave rise to the conflicts issues in the Babcock era have been
replaced by new differences, reflecting the changing nature of modern
tort problems and modern tort law, as the law has developed in re-
sponse to those problems. Today, many of the conflicts tort cases are
products liability cases, and products liability law differs considera-
bly from state to state. The differences in products liability law relate
not only to strict liability versus a negligence standard, but to mat-
ters such as "market share liability," products liability "statutes of
repose," and the availability of punitive damages. So too, in the wave
of the tort reform movement, a number of states have enacted laws
imposing caps on tort recovery, particularly for non-economic loss, in
all or some kinds of cases; 10 other states have strongly resisted the
tort reform movement and have refused to cap the recovery of tort
damages. And while most states presently recognize some form of
comparative negligence, the rules of comparative negligence differ
considerably, especially over the question of whether a plaintiff who
is "more at fault" is completely barred from recovery.
However, the changing nature of the choice-of-law issues that arise
today in conflicts tort cases should not, in any way, affect the modern
choice-of-law consensus that has emerged in the years following
Babcock. If, as I maintain, and as the courts seem to agree in prac-
tice, interest analysis is the preferred approach to resolving the issues
presented in conflicts tort cases, it remains the preferred approach
regardless of the particular substantive law differences that give rise
to the conflicts issues in today's tort cases. A state's interest in apply-
10 See generally Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.08[4][j]
(1993) (discussing recovery limiting statutes).
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ing its products liability law or law capping the recovery of tort dam-
ages is predicated on the same factors that would have given rise to
an interest in applying its guest statute or its rule of contributory
negligence at an earlier time.
The nature of tort litigation has also changed considerably since
the Babcock era. The cutting edge of tort litigation today is the
"mass tort". In the mass tort, there are hundreds and in some cases,
even thousands of victims, some of whom will suffer their injuries in
the future and may not yet have been born. The victims will reside in
many different states and possibly in some foreign countries. In some
instances their injuries may.have occurred in a state other than the
state in which they reside when the injuries surface. Likewise, there
may be multiple defendants, doing business in many different states
and possibly in foreign countries. Thus, the acts of the various de-
fendants relied on to support liability may have occurred in different
states; not all the defendants in a mass tort case may be subject to
jurisdiction in all of the same states.
In actuality, there are two kinds of mass tort cases, the single dis-
aster case, and the multi-exposure case. In the single disaster case, a
large number of persons residing in different states are killed or in-
jured in a single disaster, such as an airplane crash. Typically, the
victims or their beneficiaries will bring a negligence claim against the
airline and a products liability claim against the manufacturer of the
airplane, and sometimes against the manufacturer of a component
part as well." The multi-exposure case, or "mass toxic tort" case, in-
volves claims of a large number of persons exposed to a product that
has caused an illness or condition, such as in asbestos, Agent Orange,
Dalkon Shield and DES litigation. The problems in these cases are
complicated by the fact that a number of different manufacturers
may have manufactured the product, so that it is not always possible
to identify the individual manufacturer whose product caused the in-
juries to the particular victim. The problems are further complicated
" See, e.g., In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on August 16, 1987, 750 F. Supp. 793
(E.D. Mich. 1989). That case resulted from the crash on takeoff from Detroit Metropolitan
Airport of a Northwest Airlines DC-9, designed and manufactured by McDonnell-Douglas Cor-
poration in California, on a flight from Detroit, Michigan to Phoenix, Arizona. Id. at 795.
Northwest has its principal place of business in Minnesota, but Detroit Metropolitan Airport is
one of its "hubs," and over 60% of the daily departures from Detroit Metropolitan are North-
west flights. Id. at 807 & n.22. One hundred and fifty seven claims arising from the disaster
were filed in federal courts in Michigan, Arizona, California, and Florida. Id. at 796. The Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered the consolidation and transfer of all the cases to
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Id. at 795.
[Vol. 56
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because the injuries may not appear for a number of years, and some
potential victims, as in the DES cases, have yet to be born.1 2
Our system of separate state courts, interacting with the fact that
many defendants do business on a nationwide basis, leads to the re-
sult that: a large number of separate suits arising out of a mass tort
may be brought in a number of different state courts throughout the
country. In cases where there is complete diversity between all the
plaintiffs and all the defendants, the suits can also be brought in, 3 or
removed to,14 the federal courts. At the present time, there is no
mechanism for consolidating the separate suits brought in the various
state courts. The individual suits brought in the different federal
courts can be consolidated for trial before a single federal court
through the processes of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation.'
Because of the multiple suits in different state and federal courts
arising from the mass tort, and because of the differences in substan-
tive products liability law and other aspects of tort law from state to
state, the mass tort is said to create "choice of law litigation of stag-
gering complexity."' 6 Each state court in which suit is brought will
have to resolve the choice-of-law issues resulting from the fact that
multiple plaintiffs and defendants reside in different states and that
the acts relied on to establish liability and the harm that those acts
are alleged to have caused may have occurred in different states. The
necessity of resolving these choice-of-law issues is not eliminated in
those federal court cases that are consolidated before a single court
by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, because federal
courts are required to apply the conflict-of-laws rules of the state in
which they sit.' When a case is transferred to another federal court,
the transferee court is required to apply the conflict-of-laws rules of
the state from which the case has been transferred. 8 So, when mass
For an illuminating empirical study of the complexity of multi-exposure cases, see Linda
S. Mdllenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litiga-
tion, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 475 (1991).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
", See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (198$).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
6 Robert W. Kastenmeier & Charles G. Geyh, The Case in Support of Legislation Facilitat-
ing the Consolidation of Mass-Accident Litigation: A View from the Legislature, 73 MARQ. L.
REV. 535, 557 (1989) (quoting Court Reform and Access to Justice Act: Hearings on H.R. 3152
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 228 (1987-88)).
"7 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
" Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). This rule applies regardless of which party
initiated the transfer. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
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tort cases are consolidated before a single federal court by the Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the transferee court must ap-
ply the law that would have been applied by the transferring court in
each separate case that has been transferred to it.
II. THE "LAW OF A SINGLE JURISDICTION" RULE: A RETURN TO THE
"PLACE OF THE WRONG" RULE IN MASS TORT CASES
The proposed "progressive" solution to the problems generated by
mass tort litigation is to provide for the consolidation of mass tort
litigation before a single federal court and to require the federal court
to decide all of the substantive issues in the case under a federally-
imposed "law of a single jurisdiction" rule. As the American Bar As-
sociation Commission on Mass Torts has stated: "[s]eparate adjudi-
cation of individual tort claims arising from a single accident or use
of or exposure to the same product or substance is inefficient and
wasteful, seriously burdens both state and federal judicial systems,
poses unacceptably high risks of inconsistent results, and contributes
to public dissatisfaction with the tort law system and the legal pro-
fession.""9 Federal legislation providing for the consolidation of mass
tort litigation before a single federal court and the application of a
federally imposed "law of a single jurisdiction" rule to govern all of
the substantive issues arising from the mass tort in all of the consoli-
dated cases has been proposed in Congress, most recently in the form
of the Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1991.20
11 ABA Comm'n on Mass Torts, Revised Final Report and Recommendations 12 (Nov. 1989)
(on file with the Albany Law Review). A proposal to accept the Report was defeated by the
House of Delegates in February, 1990. A.B.A., SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 4 (1990).
,O See H.R. 2450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The bill, H.R. 2450, passed the House during
the last session, as did predecessor bills in previous sessions, but did not make it out of the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice. I testified in opposition
to the bill at a Senate Subcommittee Hearing on January 28, 1992. In November, 1989, Profes-
sor Aaron Twerski of Brooklyn Law School and I presented written testimony before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice, in
opposition to a predecessor bill, The Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1989. H.R.
3406, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Professor Twerski and I prepared a law review article con-
currently with our presentation of that testimony. Robert A. Sedler & Aaron D. Twerski, The
Case Against All Encompassing Federal Mass Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73
MARQ. L. REV. 76 (1989) [hereinafter, Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain]. Former U.S.
Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier (D. Wis.), the sponsor of the 1989 bill, and Charles G.
Geyh, Counsel to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the
Administration of Justice, responded to our article, see Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 16, to
which Professor Twerski and I responded in turn. Robert A. Sedler and Aaron D. Twerski,
State Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases: A Response to "A View from the Legislature," 73
MARQ. L.* REv. 625 (1990) [hereinafter, Sedler & Twerski, Response]. While Professor Twerski
[Vol. 56
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While the consolidation bills that have been introduced in Con-
gress cover only the single disaster case,"' the proposals presented by
the American Bar Association Commission on Mass Torts would also
cover multiple exposure to a single product line.22 It appears that the
ultimate objectives of proponents of consolidation is to have both the
single disaster cases and the multi-exposure cases consolidated before
one federal court, and to impose a federally-mandated "law of a sin-
gle jurisdiction" rule in both kinds of cases.
The thesis of this Article is that the proposed "law of a single juris-
diction rule" in mass tort cases is highly undesirable both from a
choice-of-law perspective and from a state sovereignty perspective.
This Article will not directly address the narrower question of
whether consolidation of mass tort cases is necessary or desirable.
Rather, it maintains that even if consolidation of mass tort cases is
eventually required by federal law, consolidation should be accom-
plished without displacement of state choice of law. In mass tort
cases that have been consolidated, the federal court should be re-
quired to follow state choice-of-law rules and reach the same result
that would be reached by the courts of the state from which the case
has been transferred. This would keep in place the approach that is
now followed in diversity cases where there has been a transfer of
venue from one federal court to another, including cases transferred
by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 3
What is fascinating to me, in discussing mass torts in the context
of this Babcock symposium, is that the purportedly "progressive" so-
would not concur with everything I say in the present Article (particularly the matter of inter-
est analysis being the preferred approach to choice of law), this Article borrows copiously from
the articles that Professor Twerski and I co-authored, and reflects our joint view in opposition
to a federally-imposed "law of a single jurisdiction rule" to determine choice of law in mass tort
cases.
" The Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1991 applies to any civil action involving
minimal diversity between adverse parties arising from a single accident in which at least 25
natural persons have died or incurred injury, and where either (1) one defendant resides in a
state other than the state where the accident occurred, or (2) any two defendants reside in
different states, or (3) substantial parts of the accident took place in different states. H.R. 2450,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991). Each victim must also be claiming damages in excess of
$50,000, which will always be so in personal injury or death cases. Id. See generally Hearings
on H.R. 2450 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Judi-
ciary Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The author testified in opposition to the bill. Id. at
70-116, 256-62 (testimony of Professor Robert A. Sedler).
21 ABA Comm'n on Mass Torts, Revised Final Report and Recommendations 12 (Nov. 1989)
(on file with the Albany Law Review). A proposal to accept the Report was defeated by the
House of Delegates in February, 1990. A.B.A., SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 4 (1990).
,3 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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lution to the mass tort problem, reflected in a federally-mandated
"law of a single jurisdiction" rule, would completely overturn the en-
tire choice of law revolution sparked by Babcock, at least as to those
cases. The consideration of state policies and interests that is the ba-
sis of the modern choice of law consensus would become completely
irrelevant in mass tort cases. Choice of law in mass tort cases would
almost always return to the long-discredited "place of the wrong"
rule. The only variation would be that the "place of the wrong" could
be the "place of acting" instead of the "place of harm." In short, in
the name of efficiency and consistency, the entire development of
modern choice of law over the last thirty years would be cast aside in
mass tort cases.
I will now explain why the imposition of "the law of a single juris-
diction" rule in mass tort cases would almost always compel a return
to the long-discredited "place of the wrong" rule, with only the varia-
tion that the "place of the wrong" could sometimes be the "place of
acting." The choice-of-law provision of section 6 of the Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1991, provides that in cases consoli-
dated under the Act, the federal judge shall "enter an order designat-
ing the single jurisdiction whose substantive law is to be applied, '2 4
and that in making that determination the federal judge "shall not
be bound by the choice of law rules of any State."2 5 In making that
decision, the judge is directed to consider three factual contacts and
two general considerations, "according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular action." '26 The three factual contacts
are "the place of the injury," "the place of the conduct causing the
injury," and "the principal places of business or domiciles of the par-
ties. '27 The two general considerations are "the danger of creating
unnecessary incentives for forum shopping," and "whether the choice
of law would be reasonably foreseeable to the parties. '28 At first
glance, the choice-of-law provision of section 6 appears to be a com-
bination of the primary factors used to determine the state of the
most significant relationship in tort cases under section 145 of the
Second Restatement,29 with the addition of some of the general
choice-of-law considerations set out in section 6 of the Second Re-
2 H.R. 2450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1991).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1969).
[Vol. 56
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statement.30 The federal judge ultimately would have broad discre-
tion selecting the "law of a single jurisdiction" in the particular mass
tort case.
In point of fact, however, the judge will have virtually no discretion
at all. Because of constitutional constraints on which state's law can
be selected to apply in a conflicts case, the judge's choice of "the law
of a single jurisdiction" will be severely restricted. In most mass tort
cases, the only state's law that a federal court would be able to con-
stitutionally apply to determine all the issues and claims of all the
different parties in the case would be the law of the state in which
the injury occurred, or the law of the state in which the allegedly
tortious act took place. Ordinarily those will be the only two possible
states with which all of the parties and the underlying transaction
will have constitutionally sufficient contacts.
As I have discussed more fully elsewhere,31 the Due Process and
Full Faith and Credit Clauses impose only minimal limits on which
state's law can be selected in a conflicts case. While these limits will
rarely prevent a state court from making a decision to apply its own
law or the law of another state in a particular case, these limits be-
come highly restrictive when an effort is made to apply the "law of a
single jurisdiction" to determine the claims of all the plaintiffs
against all the defendants in a mass tort case. This is especially true
when, as in the typical mass tort case, multiple plaintiffs reside in a
number of various states, and the conduct of the individual defend-
ants has occurred in different states.
The constitutional test for the. application of a state's law as set
forth by the Supreme Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,32 is
that, "for a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally
permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or sig-
nificant aggregation of contacts [with the parties and the occurrence
or transaction], creating state interests, such that choice of its law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. '33 In Phillips Petroleum
-o Id. § 6.
"' See Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of
Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 68-74 (1981).
-2 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
" Id. at 312-13. Under this test, a state's law may be constitutionally applied where the state
has an interest in applying its law to implement the policy reflected in that law and the appli-
cation of its law is not fundamentally unfair. A state's law may also be applied where that state
has sufficient factual contacts with the underlying transaction so that it is reasonable for its law
to be applied on the basis of those contacts. But, where the application of a state's law cannot
be justified either under an "interest and fairness" test or a "factual contacts" test, such appli-
1993]
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Co. v. Shutts,34 the Court held that in multiparty cases, the constitu-
tional test controls the application of a state's law to the claim of
each individual party, even though the suit takes the form of a "na-
tionwide class action." 5
The proposed federal act has the effect of converting a mass tort
case into a "nationwide class action," and requires the federal court
to select the "law of a single jurisdiction" to govern all the claims of
all of the parties in that "nationwide class action." As Shutts makes
clear, however, the fact that a "nationwide class action" is involved is
irrelevant with respect to constitutional limitations on selection of
the applicable law. The constitutional limitations on selection of a
state's law still apply to the claim of each individual party. The inter-
action of the "law of a single jurisdiction" rule with constitutional
constraints on choice of law in multiparty claims will force the fed-
eral judge into a choice-of-law straightjacket, compelling the judge to
apply the law of the state where the accident occurred, or possibly,
the law of the state in which the allegedly tortious act occurred. In
short, we will have returned to the "place of the wrong" rule, with
the "place of the wrong" sometimes being the "place of acting" in-
stead of always being the "place of harm."
That this will be the effect of such interaction is illustrated by the
following typical mass tort caseA6 One hundred and fifty California
residents leave Los Angeles on a flight to New York, with a stopover
in Detroit, Michigan. In Detroit, another twenty-five passengers, all
from Michigan, embark for the last leg of the flight to New York. The
plane crashes on take-off from the Detroit airport, killing all on
board. The allegation is that the crash was due to a design defect in
the landing gear. The aircraft was designed and manufactured by
Gruman Aircraft in New York. California law imposes a "risk utility"
burden on manufacturers in design defect claims, which is widely ac-
knowledged to effectively create strict liability for design defect.3 7
Under Michigan law and New York law, the manufacturer can rely'
on "state of the art," and so for practical purposes, can be held liable
only for negligence.
cation is arbitrary and thus, constitutionally impermissible. See Sedler, supra note 31, at 72-74,
85-92.
34 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
" For a more detailed discussion of the holding in Shutts, see Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice
Without Gain, supra note 20, at 100-101.
"O See Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 20, at 101-02.
"' See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
[Vol. 56
Federally-Mandated Choice of Law
Under the constitutional test set forth in Allstate for the permissi-
ble application of a state's law, California law could be applied in this
situation to determine California victims' claims against Gruman.
California has an interest in applying its law to determine the claims
of the California survivors, and the application of California law on
this issue is not unfair to Gruman, which has a large number of air-
planes flying in California, including the airplane involved in the fa-
tal crash. For the same reason, Michigan law could be applied to de-
termine the Michigan victims' claims. In addition, Michigan law
could be applied to determine the claims of all the survivors against
Gruman, because the accident occurred in Michigan. Similarly, New
York law could be applied to determine all these claims, because the
airplane was designed and manufactured in New York.
Under the constitutional test set forth in Shutts, however, Califor-
nia law could not be applied to determine the Michigan victims'
claims. Because the Michigan victims were not residents of Califor-
nia, California has no interest in applying its law to determine the
claims of their survivors. Furthermore, because the Michigan victims
did not board the plane in California, California law cannot be ap-
plied to determine these claims on the basis of factual contacts with
the underlying transaction. Thus, the mere presence of a single non-
California victim who boarded the plane outside of California pre-
cludes the application of California law to determine the claims of
the California survivors in this case. This amounts to a "single-
plaintiff veto" of an otherwise functionally sound choice of law result
that doubtless would have obtained if the suit had remained in Cali-
fornia-the application of the law of the victim's home state to deter-
mine the liability of the manufacturer for an accident arising out of a
flight that originated in the victim's home state's-and defeats the
strong interest of California in applying its victim-favoring rule in
design defect cases for the benefit of California victims.
Under the "law of a single jurisdiction" rule, the only applicable
law in this case could be the law of Michigan, where the accident
occurred, or the law of New York, where the product was designed
and manufactured, both of which are the same and favor the manu-
facturer. The law of California, the state where most of the victims
resided, where the manufacturer did substantial business, and where
the. trip originated, cannot, in fact, be applied in this case because
8 Cf. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961) (applying the law of victims'
home state which allowed unlimited recovery for wrongful death in interstate airplane crash
occurring in airline's home state, the law of which limited recovery for wrongful death).
1993] 865
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that law could not constitutionally be applied to determine the
claims of the Michigan survivors. 39
If, on the other hand, the crash had occurred when the plane took
off in California, California law could constitutionally be applied to
determine the claims of all the survivors against Gruman and North-
west. As in our example case, the federal court 'could choose either
the place of harm or the place of acting. But suppose that the carrier
was a regional airline that did not fly to New York and that the crash
occurred on a flight from California to Arizona. In that situation, the
federal court would be limited to selecting California law, as the law
of the place of harm, because New York law could not constitution-
ally be selected to govern the survivors' claims against the airline,
and only California law could be applied to govern the survivors'
claims against both Gruman and the airline.
The next example sees the federal court required to apply the law
of the state where the accident occurred in a mass tort arising from a
simple bus crash that involves only two states.40 Twenty-five Wiscon-
sin senior citizens embark on a three-day trip to Indiana on Grey-
hound Tours. ' 1 While the group is in Indiana, an Indiana friend of
one of the members of the group joins the tour. While traveling in
Indiana, the bus is involved in a collision with an automobile driven
by an Indiana resident and all of the passengers are seriously injured.
Both the driver of the bus and the driver of the car were negligent,
but the allocation of fault between the parties is thirty percent to
Greyhound and seventy percent to the Indiana driver, who was driv-
ing twenty-five miles over the speed limit. Indiana is one of the rela-
tively few states that has abolished joint tortfeasor liability; Wiscon-
sin retains the traditional common-law joint tortfeasor doctrine. The
driver of the Indiana car carries only $500,000 of liability insurance
and has no other significant assets. That amount is $10,000,000 short
of the amount necessary to compensate the severely injured plain-
tiffs. Greyhound has adequate insurance to cover all claims.
If Indiana law applies here, the twenty-five Wisconsin residents
will be limited to thirty percent recovery against Greyhound because
'o The claims of the Michigan survivors are appropriately determined under Michigan law,
which does not differ from New York law. The application of Michigan law to determine the
claims of the Michigan survivors, and California law to determine the claims of the California
survivors, produces a functionally sound result that would be recognized under most modern
approaches to choice of law. This result is necessarily precluded under the "law of a single
jurisdiction" rule.
40 See Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 20, at 102-03.
" For conflicts purposes, Greyhound Tours is properly considered a Wisconsin party, be-
cause the trip involved its Wisconsin operations.
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under Indiana law, the liability of Greyhound is several rather than
joint; Greyhound is liable only for its proportionate share of the fault.
If Wisconsin law applies, this limitation would not operate to reduce
recovery, because Wisconsin still follows joint and several liability.
There is no doubt that the Wisconsin plaintiffs would bring suit
against Greyhound in Wisconsin, and that Wisconsin would apply its
law imposing full liability, as well it should, because both the plain-
tiffs and the defendant are Wisconsin parties and the accident arose
out of a Wisconsin based-trip. 2
However, under the "law of a single jurisdiction" rule, the federal
court in this case could not constitutionally select Wisconsin law. Be-
cause one of the plaintiffs is from Indiana and the accident occurred
in Indiana, involving an Indiana driver, Wisconsin law could not con-
stitutionally be selected to govern the claim of the Indiana plaintiff
against the Indiana driver.43 This being so, as, a constitutional matter,
only Indiana law can be the "law of the single jurisdiction" selected
to govern the claims of all the plaintiffs. Thus, the court and the par-
ties are forced back to the "place of the wrong" rule. Wisconsin law
cannot be applied to govern the liability of a Wisconsin defendant to
Wisconsin plaintiffs, and Wisconsin cannot apply its law in order to
implement the policy reflected in that law in a case where it has a
strong interest in doing so.
A third example will apply the "law of a single jurisdiction" rule to
a multi-exposure or "mass toxic tort" case, demonstrating that the
only state's law that could constitutionally be applied in such a case
is the "law of the place of acting." We will simplify things by having
a single manufacturer that manufactured the product in its home
state, New York. Instead of having plaintiffs in all fifty states, as is
typical in mass toxic tort cases, we will have one group of plaintiffs in
California and another group in Michigan. All of the plaintiffs suf-
fered the injuries in their home states. As in our previous New York-
California-Michigan example involving the airplane crash, the issue is
the standard of liability for design defect claims. Recall that Califor-
nia imposes strict liability for design defect claims, while New York
and Michigan impose liability only on the basis of negligence. There
42 This is the fact-law pattern of Babcock. The Babcock decision was followed in Wisconsin
two years later in Wilcox v. Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. 1965).
, Wisconsin has no interest in applying its law to allow recovery to an Indiana victim against
an Indiana driver, where the accident involving that victim had no factual contacts with Wis-
consin. Because the application of Wisconsin law could not be sustained under either an "inter-
est" or "fairness" test, or on the basis of factual contacts with the underlying transaction, the
application of Wisconsin law would be arbitrary and constitutionally impermissible.
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is a conflict between California law and New York law on the point in
issue here, and there is no doubt that if the California victims
brought suit in California against the New York manufacturer, Cali-
fornia would apply its own law.""
However, the law of California could not constitutionally be ap-
plied to determine the claims of the Michigan victims because Cali-
fornia would have no interest in applying its law for the benefit of
Michigan victims injured in their home state. Here then, the only
state's law that could be constitutionally selected to govern the
claims of all the toxic tort victims is the law of the state of manufac-
ture, New York. New York is the only state having factual contacts
with respect to the claims of all the victims who reside in different
states. Thus, in the "mass toxic tort" case, the "law of a single juris-
diction" rule will invariably mandate the application of the "law of
the place of acting" to govern the claims of all the victims, residing in
different states, having suffered the harm in their respective home
states.
We see then that in both the single disaster case and the multi-
exposure case, the "law of a single jurisdiction" rule turns out to be
nothing more than a slightly modified "place of the wrong" rule, with
the "place of the wrong" potentially being the "place of harm" or
"the place of acting." The law of the states where the parties reside
or have their principal place of business can never be selected as the
"law of a single jurisdiction" in mass tort cases. The state where par-
ties reside or have their principal place of business can have rele-
vance, if at all, only as an additional factor to weigh in selecting the
place of harm or the place of acting when a choice between those two
places as the "law of a single jurisdiction" is constitutionally
permissible.45
We will use one other "mass toxic tort" case example to illustrate
the situation where there is no state that could be selected as the
"law of a single jurisdiction. '4 6 This will occur in a case in which dif-
44 See, e.g., Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972) (California products
liability law applied in the victim's suit against the manufacturer where the California victim
purchased a product in California, manufactured by an out-of-state manufacturer, and was in-
jured while using the product in Mexico); cf Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal.
1976) (California law imposing liability against liquor establishment for harm caused by intoxi-
cated patron applied where a California victim was injured in California by a California driver
who became intoxicated at defendant's gambling establishment located across the state line in
Nevada).
15 As pointed out above, in the "mass toxic tort" case, only the "place of acting" can consti-
tutionally be selected as the "law of a single jurisdiction."
" See Sedler. & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 20, at 104-05.
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ferent manufacturers, operating in different states, are sought to be
held liable to groups of victims residing in other states on the same
underlying toxic tort claim. We will assume here that the point in
issue relates to determining liability on the basis of market share,
which some states recognize and others do not.4 7 Again, to simplify
matters, we will have one group of victims residing in State A and
another groups of victims residing in' State B. One company manu-
factured the product in State C, and another manufactured the prod-
uct in-State D. Both manufacturers do business nationwide. The laws
of State A and State C recognize market share liability, while the
laws of State B and State D do not.
The law of State A could be constitutionally selected to govern the
claims of the State A victims against both manufacturers, but could
not be constitutionally selected to govern the claims of the State B
victims against the manufacturers, and vice-versa. The law of State C
could constitutionally be selected to govern the claims of both the
State A and the State B victims against the State C manufacturer,
but could not be constitutionally selected to govern their claims
against the State D manufacturer. Nor could the law of State D be
selected to govern their claims against the State C manufacturer. In
this case, because of constitutional constraints on choice of law, we
have run out of law. There is no single jurisdiction whose law could
constitutionally be selected to govern the claims of all the victims
residing in different states against the two manufacturers who manu-
factured the product in different states."8
Because the "law of a single jurisdiction" rule then turns out to be
nothing more than a federally-mandated return to the "place of the
wrong" rule in mass tort cases, there will have been a counter-
revolution in these cases in the name of efficiency and consistency.
The choice-of-law revolution and the modern choice-of-law consensus
in conflicts tort cases will have been swept aside. Sweeping aside the
modern choice-of-law consensus will, of course, bring to an end the
use of interest analysis to resolve the choice-of-law issues in mass tort
cases. Choice of law in conflicts tort cases will thus become bifur-
17 See generally FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, § 1.09[5] (discussing market share lia-
bility and states that do and do not recognize it).
'8 In this circumstance, it will be necessary for the federal court to depart from the "law of a
single jurisdiction" rule. Section 6 of the Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1991 has
apparently contemplated such a situation by providing: "If good cause is shown in exceptional
cases, including constitutional reasons, the court may allow the law of more than one State to
be applied with respect to a party, claim, or other element of an action." H.R. 2450, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 6 (1991). Outside of this exceptional case, however, the court would not be author-
ized to depart from the "law of a single jurisdiction" rule.
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cated. In the ordinary conflicts tort case, the courts will continue' to
apply interest analysis under the modern choice-of-law consensus.
But in mass tort cases, there will have been an unfortunate return to
the "place of the wrong rule."
III. INTEREST ANALYSIS'AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
I now want to. relate the interest analysis approach to choice of law,
and the relevance of policies and interests in the choice-of-law pro-
cess, to the constitutional concept of state sovereignty. I submit that
the imposition of a federally-mandated "law of a single jurisdiction"
rule in mass tort cases is inconsistent with the constitutional concept
of state sovereignty; among other things, it would require the states
to sacrifice the strong policies underlying their substantive tort laws
by foreclosing application of a state's' law when the state has a real
interest in implementing its policies.
To develop this submission, I must first deal directly with the
question of whether states do have "real" interests in having their
rules of substantive tort law applied in litigation between private liti-
gants, such as in mass tort cases. Critics of the interest analysis ap-
proach, such as Professor Juenger, argue that the approach is concep-
tually flawed because it proceeds on the assumption that states have
governmental interests in applying rules of substantive law to litiga-
tion between private persons. Professor Juenger insists that states do
not have such governmental interests, and that this being so, to base
an approach to choice of law on the implementation of non-existent
governmental interests is conceptually unsound.49 Professor Juenger
draws a distinction between what he calls "real" and "spurious" gov-
ernmental interests." "Real" governmental interests refer to a state's
fiscal and proprietary interests, such as those connected with reve-
nue, escheat, boundary disputes, and water rights.5 1 The governmen-
tal interests that are the basis of the interest analysis approach, says
Professor Juenger, are "spurious," because they do not involve a
state's proprietary or fiscal interests.52 This being so, the very notion
See Friedrich K. Juenger, Governmental Interests-Real and Spurious-in Multistate
Disputes, 21 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 515, 518-28 (1988).
80 Id. at 518.
Id. at 518-28.
52 Id.
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of governmental interests as the basis for resolving choice-of-law
problems is highly implausible.5 3
In replying to this criticism of lack of governmental interests by
Professor Juenger, I maintain that states do have "real" interests in
having certain laws applied in disputes between private litigants,""
and that with respect to these laws, it is indeed proper to speak of
governmental interests. Let me start off with regulatory laws, such as
federal antitrust or securities laws. Professor Juenger recognizes that
the United States has a "real" governmental interest in the applica-
tion of these kinds of laws.5 5 However, while the United States can
enforce the antitrust and securities laws directly in a criminal or civil
action against the offending party, private parties injured by a viola-
tion of those laws can likewise enforce them by bringing a civil action
against the offending party. 6 For example, Congress has encouraged
such enforcement of the antitrust laws by providing for the recovery
of multiple damages and attorney's fees by prevailing plaintiffs.57
Regulatory laws such as these directly implicate the social engineer-
ing function of law,"8 and the governmental interest of the United
States in implementing the policies reflected in the antitrust and se-
53 Id.; see also Friedrich K. Juenger, Governmental Interests and Multistate Justice: A Re-
ply to Professor Sedler, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 227, 227-29 (1990).
" At the same time, I have also insisted that the premise of the interest analysis approach to
choice of law is not that the purpose of conflicts law is to advance a state's governmental inter-
est. Rather, I maintain that the underlying premise of interest analysis as an approach to
choice of law is that consideration of the policies and interests of the involved states is the most
rational and functionally sound method of resolving the choice-of-law issues in private party
litigation. I further maintain that the rationality justification for the interest analysis approach
exists independently of the fact that states have real interests in applying their law in litigation
between private parties. "Precisely because it is rational to make choice-of-law decisions with
reference to the policies and interests of the involved states, the application of the interest
analysis approach generally will produce functionally sound and fair results." Sedler, Response
to Juenger, supra note 8, at 880. However, when I seek to relate interest analysis to the concept
of state sovereignty, I must deal directly with the question of whether states do have "real"
interests in having certain laws applied in disputes between private litigants.
" In the context of discussing the extraterritorial application of federal regulatory laws, Pro-
fessor Juenger says that, "no one questions the reality of foreign and domestic interests that are
at loggerheads when, for instance, the United States proceeds against restrictive trade practices
that are lawful in the defendant's home country." Friedrich K. Juenger, Constitutional Control
of Extraterritoriality?: A Comment on Professor Brilmayer's Appraisal, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1987, at 39, 42.
" See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1988) (dealing with private right of action for various
securities frauds).
" See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (allowing recovery of treble damages and reasonable attor-
ney's fees in private antitrust suits).
" For a discussion of the state's interest in the enforcement of laws involving the "social
engineering" function, see AMos SHAPIRA, THE INTEREST APPROACH TO CHOICE OF LAW 64-66,
72-73 (1970).
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curities laws is directly advanced when these laws are invoked by an
injured party in a private action brought against an alleged violator.59
An equally clear example of a "real" governmental interest is when
the state relies on the injured party to pursue private litigation for
intentional torts, instead of criminal prosecution, in order to deter
and redress violations of personal security. For example, if two
spouses from State X, which still recognizes spousal immunity, are
.involved in an altercation in State Y, which does not, it cannot be
doubted that State Y has a "real" governmental interest in applying
its law to impose liability on the battering spouse.
My point then is that it must be recognized that governments have
a spectrum of interests with respect to their rules of substantive law;
the strength of the government's interest with respect to the applica-
tion of a particular rule of substantive law is not conclusively, or even
significantly, determined by whether that interest is being imple-
mented by the government itself or by private persons in the context
of private litigation. Depending on the nature of the particular rule of
substantive law involved, a state may have as "real" an interest in
having its law applied in litigation between private persons as it does
in a case in which the state itself is a party. It is precisely because so
many conflicts tort cases do present a conflict between laws reflecting
strong policies of the involved states that courts make the choice-of-
law decision in these cases with reference to those policies. Likewise,
the forum in such a case is unwilling to displace its own law when it
has a real interest in applying its law to implement its own policy.
States, then, can. have "real" interests in the application of their law
in litigation between private persons.
This "real" governmental interest is present with most rules of
substantive tort law. Perhaps the "real" governmental interest is
clearest with respect to tort rules reflecting regulatory policies, such
as rules of products liability law that impose strict liability on manu-
facturers and provide for the award of punitive damages."0 However,
I submit that the. "real" governmental interest is no less clear with
respect to the tort rules that govern all aspects of enterprise liability.
In this country, tort law, rather than social insurance, is still the pri-
51 See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (per curiam) (discussing
vindication of public interests by private litigants in the enforcement of civil rights laws).
80 In In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on August 16, 1987, 750 F. Supp. 793 (E.D.
Mich. 1989), the Court held that California law, imposing strict liability and allowing the recov-
ery of punitive damages in product liability cases, reflected a "producer regulatory policy," id.
at 801, and thus should be applied against the California manufacturer that manufactured the
aircraft involved in the crash in Michigan.
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mary method of providing compensation for accident victims. For
this reason, a state can have a "real" governmental interest in having
its tort law applied to implement the compensatory policy reflected
in that law in the same manner as it would have a "real" governmen-
tal interest in applying its social insurance law to provide compensa-
tion for its residents who have been injured in accidents. 1 That
"real" governmental interest in having its tort law applied is impli-
cated whenever a resident of that state is involved in an accident be-
cause the social and economic consequences of the accident and of
imposing or denying' liability will be felt by the victim in that state.
Conversely, a state's interest in applying the defendant-protecting el-
ements reflected in its tort law is implicated whenever the defendant
is a resident of that state because the consequences of imposing or
denying liability will be felt by the defendant and the defendant's
insurer in that state.2 Thus, most rules of substantive tort law do
reflect strong policies. The involved states will indeed have a "real"
governmental interest in having their rules of substantive tort law
applied to implement those policies in particular cases.
We now return to the concept of state sovereignty and the impact
of a federally-mandated "law of a single jurisdiction" rule in mass
tort cases. Such a rule implicates state sovereignty in two ways. First,
it deprives the states of their power to promulgate the rules gov-
erning disputes between private parties in mass tort cases. Second,
and more importantly for present purposes, it would require that the
states sacrifice the strong policies underlying their substantive tort
laws by denying the application of a state's law in cases where the
state would have a real interest in implementing its policy.
The significance of state sovereignty in the American constitutional
system and congressional respect for state sovereignty has been de-
tailed elsewhere and will only briefly be summarized here. 3 In Amer-
ican constitutional theory, the sovereignty formerly possessed by the
61 It may not be entirely coincidental that Currie frequently looked to the Supreme Court's
constitutional decisions recognizing a state's interest in applying its workers' compensation law
to injured workers, such as Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493 (1939), and Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), in
developing the interest analysis approach. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 5, at 160-63, 181-83,
201-14, 259-66.
6" In In re Disaster at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, the court held that Michigan had a
"real" interest in applying its own law disallowing punitive damages to all the punitive damages
claims against Northwest in order to protect Northwest (which uses Detroit Metropolitan Air-
port as a "hub") from such liability in an accident arising out of Northwest's Michigan business
activity. In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 750 F. Supp. at 805-07.
3 See Sedler and Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 20, at 82-87.
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British Crown over domestic matters devolved upon each of the
states at the time of Independence. Consequently, the states have the
primary responsibility for developing the legal rules that govern dis-
putes between private persons and adjudicating such disputes in
their courts. While Congress has the power to override or displace
state law, as a matter of federal supremacy, Congress has recognized
that any exercise of federal power should be undertaken with due
regard for the traditional sovereignty of the states and their role in
the federal system."
Congress' regard for the traditional sovereignty of the states is
most prominent in relation to the states' power to develop legal rules
governing disputes between private persons and to adjudicate such
disputes in their courts. Congress has long recognized this fundamen-
tal principle of our federal system by requiring the application of
state law in diversity cases under the Rules of Decision Act,65 which
includes, of course, the application of state conflicts law. 6 Congress
has also limited the scope of diversity jurisdiction in the federal
courts by requiring complete diversity rather than the constitution-
ally permissible "minimal diversity." 7 It has also done so by provid-
ing that a corporation is a citizen of the state where it is incorporated
as well as the state where it has its principal place of business, and
by, in 1988, increasing fivefold the jurisdictional amount in diversity
cases from $10,000 to $50,000.8
Congressional respect for state sovereignty in this area is also evi-
denced in the Supreme Court's extreme reluctance to find federal
preemption of the states' power to promulgate legal rules governing
the disputes between private persons. 9 Finally, Congress has been
unwilling to use its power over interstate commerce to enact federal
substantive law, such as a national products liability law, that would
displace state law applicable to the resolution of disputes between
See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-52 (1985).
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
00 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The underlying premise of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and the "outcome-determinative" test reflected in
its progeny, is uniformity of result between federal and state courts in diversity cases. To pro-
mote uniformity of result, whenever there is a transfer of venue from one federal court to an-
other under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the transferee court must apply the law, including the conflicts
law, that would have been applied by the transferor court had the case remained there. Ferens
v. John Derre Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
67 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988); see also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S.
523, 531 (1967) ("Article III poses no obstacle to ... diversity [jurisdiction] so long as any two
adverse parties are not co-citizens.").
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
69 See, e.g., New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973).
[Vol. 56
Federally-Mandated Choice of Law
private persons, even though these disputes may significantly affect
interstate commerce. Nor, of course, has Congress used its powers
under the Commerce Clause or the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
impose uniform choice-of-law rules on the states.
Congress then has been extremely solicitous of the primary respon-
sibility of the states in our federal system which is to promulgate the
law applicable to disputes between private persons and to adjudicate
such disputes in their courts. The mandatory removal of mass tort
cases from the state courts and their consolidation before a single
federal court, without more, would subvert this function of the states
in our federal system by depriving them of the power to. hear cases
that would otherwise come within state court jurisdiction."0 More-
over, as I have demonstrated, the imposition of a federally-mandated
"law of a single jurisdiction" rule in such cases would be a slightly
modified "place of the wrong" rule, subverting this function of the
states in the most drastic way possible.
First, in mass tort cases it would destroy the basic premise of fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction: in a diversity case, there should be uni-
formity of result between state and federal courts. Under the "law of
a single jurisdiction" rule, the states would be completely deprived of
their power to determine the substantive law to be applied to the
disputes between private persons in mass tort cases.71 Second, as
stated above, the imposition of a federally-mandated "law of a single
jurisdiction" rule would require the states to sacrifice the strong poli-
cies reflected in their substantive tort laws by denying application of
a state's law in cases where the state would have a real interest in
implementing the policy underlying that law. As I have demon-
strated, just as state policies and interests were completely irrelevant
under the "place of the wrong" rule of the traditional approach, they
are likewise completely irrelevant under the slightly modified "place
of the wrong" rule that the federal court would be compelled to apply
because of constitutional constraints on selecting the "law of a single
jurisdiction" in a mass tort case.
In my previous example of the California-Michigan plane crash in-
volving the New York manufacturer, the "law of a single jurisdiction"
rule would preclude. the application of California's victim-favoring
products liability law to determine the tort claims of the survivors of
'the California passengers against the New York manufacturer be-
70 Today, cases may be brought in, or removed to, the federal courts only when there is
"complete diversity" between all plaintiffs and all defendants. The proposed federal law would
allow removal on the basis of "minimal diversity" only. See supra note 21.
" See the discussion of this point in Sedler & Twerski, Response, supra note 20, at 627-28.
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cause some of the victims of the crash were from Michigan. Likewise,
I have used the example of the Wisconsin bus trip to Indiana, in
which Wisconsin law could not be applied to allow the Wisconsin vic-
tims to receive full recovery against the Wisconsin defendant, Grey-
hound, for the accident in Indiana, because an Indiana victim and an
Indiana driver were also involved in the accident. Two other exam-
ples will now be used in which two different states both have a real
interest in applying their own law to determine the claims of differ-
ent parties arising from the same mass tort.
The first example is a single disaster case. 72 To attend an Elks con-
vention, twenty members of the Elks Club in Colorado charter a bus
in Denver for a trip to Phoenix, Arizona. The bus company, Colorado
Coaches, Inc., is a Colorado corporation doing business mostly within
the state. In Phoenix, thirty Arizona Elks members board the bus for
a local sightseeing trip. Due to the negligence of the bus driver, the
bus hits a culvert, causing the bus to overturn. All of the passengers
suffer serious and debilitating injuries. A 1987 Colorado law limits
recovery for non-economic injuries, to $250,000 for each plaintiff.
There is no such limitation under Arizona law.
A functionally sound result in this case, one respecting the inter-
ests of both Colorado and Arizona, is for the Arizona plaintiffs to
obtain unlimited recovery under Arizona law, but for the Colorado
plaintiffs to be limited to the $250,000 limitation on non-economic
loss in accordance with Colorado law. Colorado law should apply in
the suit between the Colorado plaintiffs and the Colorado defendant
because the parties are residents of the same state, and the social and
economic consequences of the accident, and of allowing or limiting
recovery, will be felt by the parties in that state. This is the result
that is likely to obtain in practice today, regardless of whether the
suit is brought in Arizona or in Colorado.7 3
The Arizona plaintiffs, however, should obtain unlimited recovery
in accordance with Arizona law. Arizona's policy of allowing unlim-
ited recovery will be advanced whenever the victim is a resident of
Arizona. The application of Arizona law to allow unlimited recovery
is fully fair to the defendant since the accident occurred in Arizona
on a local sightseeing trip. The Arizona plaintiffs will bring their suit
in Arizona and the Arizona court will apply its own law allowing
recovery. 74
72 See Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 20, at 87-90.
" See the discussion of this point in Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note
20, at 88-89.
"' Id. at 87-88.
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The overall result, with the Arizona plaintiffs obtaining unlimited
recovery under Arizona law, and the Colorado plaintiffs being limited
to the amount permitted under Colorado law, is thus functionally
sound and fair to all the parties involved. It is irrelevant in this re-
gard that the Arizona plaintiffs and the Colorado plaintiffs were vic-
tims in the same mass tort. The "mass" nature of the tort has noth-
ing whatsoever to do with the consequences of that tort for the
individual victims or the interests of the victims' home states in ap-
plying their respective laws to determine the victims' right to tort
recovery. The consequences of this mass tort will be felt by the vic-
tims in their home states and it is the law of their respective home
states that should apply to determine their right to recover.7 5
However, the "law of the single jurisdiction" rule would require the
federal court to apply either the law of Arizona, where the accident
occurred, or the law of Colorado, where the defendant has its princi-
pal place of business, 6 to determine the claims of both the Arizona
plaintiffs and the Colorado plaintiffs. This would mean that either
the Arizona plaintiffs would be denied unlimited recovery, or more
likely, because the accident occurred in Arizona, the Colorado plain-
tiffs would get a windfall under Arizona law that would not be availa-
ble to them according to the law of their home state or if suit had
been brought in either the Colorado or Arizona courts.
There is ,no reason whatsoever to deny the Colorado defendant the
protection that the Colorado legislature sought to provide for it,
while giving the Colorado plaintiffs a windfall denied to them by the
Colorado legislature. The application of the "law of a single jurisdic-
tion" rule in this case unjustifiably defeats the strong policy of Colo-
7' Proponents of the application of the "law of a single jurisdiction" in mass tort cases con-
tend that inconsistent and unfair results obtain when different laws are applied to similarly
situated parties involved in the same tort, and that the application of the law of the same state
to determine the rights of the parties will promote equality of result. Kastenmeier & Geyh,
supra note 16, at 551-52. What this argument fails to comprehend is that it trades vertical
equality for horizontal equality, doing so at the expense of the policies and interests of the
parties' home states. The accident victims from Colorado and Arizona in this mass tort case are
similarly situated only in the sense that they have been involved in the same accident. They are
not similarly situated with respect to the policies embodied in the laws of the different states
nor the interests of the involved states in having their laws applied to implement those under-
lying policies. The victims from the different states are treated equally when each set of victims
gets the protection, or lack of it, provided by the law of each set of victims' home state. See the
discussion of "Horizontal Versus Vertical Inequality" in Sedler & Twerski, Response, supra
note 20, at 635-37.
6 Because only one defendant is involved in this single disaster case, it is constitutionally
permissible to apply the law of the defendant's home state to determine the claims of all the
victims. This is one situation where the court would not be required to apply the law of the
place of the wrong as the "law of a single jurisdiction."
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rado as to Colorado parties, without advancing any legitimate policy
of Arizona.
The second example involves the multi-exposure or "mass toxic
tort."7 To simplify things, assume that only one manufacturer has
produced the product and that it caused injuries to residents of all
fifty states. Also assume that the products liability law of half the
states is more favorable to victims while the products liability law of
the other half is more favorable to manufacturers. Finally, assume
that the law of the state of manufacture is more favorable to manu-
facturers. In this circumstance, where the law of the plaintiffs' home
state is more favorable to plaintiffs, the plaintiffs will bring suit in
their home state, which will apply its own law because it has a real
interest in applying its plaintiff-favoring law for the benefit of its res-
ident plaintiffs. Where the law of the plaintiffs' home state is
favorable to manufacturers, there is simply no conflict of laws on the
point in issue because the law of the state of manufacture is also
more favorable to manufacturers. In this "mass toxic tort" case, a
functionally sound and fair result is to permit each set of plaintiffs to
receive the protection, or lack of it, provided by the law of their home
states. Because the manufacturer does business on a nationwide ba-
sis, it can foresee the application of the law of every state. Where the
law of the victims' home state is plaintiff-favoring, that state has a
real interest in applying its law for the benefit of its resident plain-
tiffs and should be permitted to do so.
Under the "law of a single jurisdiction" rule, the only applicable
law that could constitutionally be selected in this situation is the law
of the manufacturer's home state, with its manufacturer-protecting
policy. This is because the law of the state where one set of victims
resides cannot constitutionally be applied to determine the claims of
another set of victims residing in another state. Thus, the application
of the "law of a single jurisdiction" rule here will prevent the states
whose laws favor plaintiffs from applying their plaintiff-favoring law
for the benefit of their resident plaintiffs.
The examples we have given can be multiplied many times over. In
the interstate accident situation, as I have said many times, the pri-
marily interested states are the parties' home states where the conse-
quences of the accident and of allowing or denying recovery will be
felt by the parties. The ability of each state to apply its law in pri-
vate litigation where it has an interest in applying its law to imple-
ment the policy reflected in that law is an important attribute of
See Sedler & Twerski, Sacrifice Without Gain, supra note 20, at 93-94.
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state sovereignty. The requirement that all claims arising out of a
mass tort be determined by the "law of a single jurisdiction" sacri-
fices vital state interests in the name of "efficiency and consistency."
The regard for state sovereignty that is so fundamental in our consti-
tutional system, and that has been so long recognized by Congress,
strongly argues against denying the states the power to apply their
own law to advance their own policies and interests, notwithstanding
that a mass tort is involved. 8
8 As stated previously, because the focus of this Article has been on the impact of a
federally-mandated "law of a single jurisdiction" rule on modern developments in choice of law
and on state sovereignty, I have not addressed the independent question of whether consolida-
tion of mass tort cases before a single federal court is necessary or desirable. Rather, my sub-
mission has been that if consolidation is going to be required, it should be accomplished with-
out displacement of state choice of law. Under this approach, where the mass tort cases have
been consolidated, the federal court should be required to follow state choice of law and reach
the same choice-of-law result that would be reached by the courts of the state from which the
case has been transferred.
The federal judge handling the consolidated cases would be performing the same task that
the judge now performs in dealing with cases that have been consolidated by the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation. The number of separate choice-of-law decisions that the judge
would have to make in dealing with the consolidation of a large mass tort case would perhaps
be increased, but there is no reason to believe that the federal judge would not be fully capable
of applying the different conflict-of-laws rules of each of the states where the separate suits
have been filed. See Sedler & Twerski, Response, supra note 20, at 632-34.
The ability of a federal judge to resolve choice-of-law issues under the different conflict laws
of a number of states in a mass torts case is illustrated by the disposition of the choice of law
issues by Chief Judge Julian Abele Cook, Jr. of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan in In re Disaster at Detroit Metropolitan Airport on August 16, 1987, 750
F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1989), portions of which I have previously discussed. That case, it will
be recalled, resulted from the crash on takeoff from Detroit Metropolitan Airport of a North-
west Airlines DC-9, designed and manufactured by McDonnell-Douglas Corporation on a flight
from Detroit to Phoenix, Arizona. Id. at 795. All on board were killed, except for a four-year-
old child, and other persons on the ground were killed or injured. Id. One hundred and fifty
seven claims were filed in federal courts in Michigan, Arizona, California, and Florida. Id. at
796. For the most part, the plaintiffs were residents of the state where they filed their claims.
The plaintiffs asserted a negligence claim against Northwest and a design defect claim against
McDonnell-Douglas, seeking compensatory and punitive damages against both defendants. Id.
When the case was consolidated for trial before the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Chief Judge Cook resolved the choice-of-law issues by identifying
the substantive law questions on which the laws of the involved states differed, and deciding
what state's law would be applied on each of the substantive law questions by the courts of
each of the four states where separate federal suits had been filed. The two substantive law
questions on which the laws of the involved states differed related to the standard of liability in
design defect cases and the availability of punitive damages. Id. at 800, 806-07.
As we have discussed previously, the issue of the standard of liability in design defect cases
and the recovery of punitive damages against Northwest presented a false conflict. California,
the state of manufacture, had a real interest in applying its law to implement the "producer
regulatory" policy reflected in that law, while none of the other involved states, such as Michi-
gan, whose law on this issue required a showing of negligence, would have any interest in apply-
ing the manufacturer-protecting policy reflected in that law for the benefit of the California
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IV. CONCLUSION
The nature of tort litigation and the kinds of conflicts tort cases
that were presented at the time of Babcock may have changed dra-
matically in the thirty years since Babcock was decided. But the
choice-of-law revolution that Babcock sparked has resulted in a mod-
ern choice-of-law consensus in favor of an approach to choice of law
in tort cases that looks to the interests of the involved states in hav-
ing their laws applied to implement the underlying policies reflected
in those laws. Those policies and interests are no less present and of
no less importance in the mass tort case than they were in the more
simple conflicts tort cases of the Babcock era. Considerations of state
sovereignty also require respect for the traditional function of the
states to develop legal rules governing disputes between private per-
sons and to adjudicate such disputes in their courts. Most signifi-
cantly, considerations of state sovereignty demand that the states not
be forced to sacrifice the strong policies underlying their substantive
tort laws by a federally-mandated "law of a single jurisdiction" rule
that would deny the application of a state's law in cases where the
state would have a real interest in implementing its policies.
manufacturer. Thus, Chief Judge Cook predicted that all of the four states would apply Califor-
nia law on this issue. Id. at 802-04.
On the issue of recovery of punitive damages against Northwest, Michigan had a real interest
in applying its law disallowing recovery of punitive damages in favor of Northwest in order to
protect Northwest, which uses Detroit Metropolitan Airport as a "hub." Id. at 807. Chief Judge
Cook also predicted that California, following the "comparative impairment" approach, and
Arizona and Florida, following the state of the most significant relationship approach, would
apply Michigan law on this issue. Id. at 808-11. This prediction seems to be clearly correct. It is
questionable whether the victim's home state can assert a legitimate interest in applying its law
allowing punitive damages to conduct of a defendant occurring in another state. It is likewise
questionable whether the application of the law of the victim's home state in this circumstance
would be constitutionally permissible.
As it turned out, despite the fact that the cases were filed in four different federal courts,
under the conflict-of-laws rules of the four different states, the choice-of-law results would be
the same in this case. All states would apply California law with respect to the issue of design
defect liability and punitive damages in the claims against McDonnell-Douglas, and all the
states would apply Michigan law with respect to the punitive damages claims against North-
west. Perhaps because of the guidance furnished by Chief Judge Cook's choice-of-law decisions,
all of the wrongful death and personal injury claims against both defendants were settled with-
out trial.
The resolution of choice-of-law issues with reference to the conflicts law of the states from
which the cases have been transferred is also facilitated by the fact that under the modern
choice-of-law consensus, the courts have tended to reach fairly uniform results in the different
fact-law patterns that are presented in conflicts tort cases. Therefore, it is not surprising that
Chief Judge Cook found that Michigan, California, Arizona, and Florida would all reach the
same result with respect to the choice-of-law issues presented in that case.
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Mass tort cases may ligitimately raise concerns about efficiency
and consistency. But these concerns should not cause us to com-
pletely overturn the entire choice-of-law revolution of the last thirty
years and unjustifiably intrude on state sovereignty by denying the
states the power to advance the strong policies of their substantive
tort laws in mass tort cases. However we decide to address the prob-
lem of mass torts litigation in the United States, we should categori-
cally reject the proposition that all of the issues in a mass torts case
must. be determined by a federally-mandated "law of a single
jurisdiction."
